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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the rule of law and income inequality and poverty
in twenty Latin American countries using an unbalanced panel over the period 1995 - 2014. These
results are then compared to estimates for non-Latin American counties. Using feasible GLS panel
methods, we find that in many cases, improvements to legal systems reduce inequality and poverty in
Latin America while having the opposite effect in the rest of the world. Results are robust to different
definitions of inequality and rule of law. Protection of property rights is the most significant rule of
law indicator for Latin America economies.
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Introduction
What role does the rule of law play in income inequality and poverty? There is no ex ante reason that a
well designed legal systems should function as a re-distributive entity. However, a country’s rule of law
also accompanies other institutions which play a larger role in flattening the playing field for its’ citizens.
For example, we might expect that imbuing an economy with protection of property rights, in this case
labor, would yield better outcomes for utility maximizing workers. Alternatively, reducing corruption,
or bribery, will lessen opportunities for rent seeking members of higher income quintiles while protecting
lower income workers from dishonest employers. Or some combination of the two.
To date, the majority of empirical income inequality literature is concentrated on five major categories:
growth, human capital (i.e. education and health), government policy, institutions, and investment. The
effects of institutions on income inequality, Alesina and Perotti (1996) confirm that reduced equality fuels
social discontent which destabilizes the political structure making investment more uncertain potentially
undermining future growth. On the other hand, Barro (2000) is unable to corroborate this result, but
does find evidence supporting the Kuznets curve. In their examination of corruption and inequality and
poverty, Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) demonstrate that rising levels of corruption, and their
channels, exacerbate inequality and poverty. Later, Esfahania and Ramı´rez (2003) find that institutions
in concert with better infrastructure can lead to lower income inequality.
The OECD (2014) confirms the rise of inequality among OECD countries, with the Gini coefficient
rising three points over the past two decades. Furthermore, the OECD argues that this increase in
inequality has led to a 0.35% decline in annual growth rates for the past 25 years. Adding to the
ambivalence, Anand and Segal (2008) establish there is no conclusive evidence as to which direction
inequality is heading. In Latin America much of the research on income inequality and poverty in Latin
America has focused on the historical and colonial past of the countries in the region and how economic
growth has effected distribution and poverty. Berry (1997) provides a nice overview of the causes of
high equality in Latin America through 1995 – including: agricultural reforms, liberalization of trade
policies, educational deficiencies, and market reforms, some imposed by austerity programs and others
home-grown.
Another canonical response is that rising development leads first to a worsening of inequality before
it gradually declines, known as the Kuznets’ “inverted-U” hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955). In a similar
vein, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) pay special attention to this in their investigation of growth and
inequality in twelve Latin American countries. They add a twist to their investigation by considering
the asymmetric impacts of income growth on inequality during recessionary and expansionary periods.
Whereas the Kuznets’ hypothesis can be considered a “long run” relationship, de Janvry and Sadoulet
(2000) consider the impacts of short run fluctuations on inequality and poverty. They find that recessions
lead to rising inequality and that offsets any gains during expansions. Moreover, they also show that
inequality gains or losses are contingent upon what “stage” of development a country is in, corroborating
the Kuznets’ hypothesis.
As an alternative, much of the literature on income inequality in Latin America has concentrated on
historical colonial ties, Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez, and Schott (1999) focus on the relative abundance of
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natural resources in the region as a potential culprit. They compare Latin America with Asian countries,
which are relatively less endowed with resources, and find that access to greater resources does lead to
higher inequality. At first blush, this appears to be somewhat independent of the historical or institutional
perspective. However, as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) show, this is, in part, due to the
nature of historical ties. Using a novel IV approach, they demonstrate that the type of institutions was
a function of European mortality rates. When rates were relatively high, colonizers sought out resource
rich regions and established institutions to exploit those resources, this created separate classes of both
colonizers and indigenous populations, Robinson and Sokoloff (2004).
In this paper, I investigate the role the rule of law plays in influencing inequality and poverty across
Latin America and the rest of the world. Using an unbalanced panel roughly 147 countries over the
period 1995 – 2014 with feasible GLS this paper concludes that the protection of property rights leads
to a reduction of both inequality and the poverty gap in Latin America, whereas the opposite is true in
the rest of the world. An additional conclusion is impartial courts have no impact on inequality in Latin
America while in the rest of the world it leads to an increase in inequality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief overview of the extant
literature on the effects of legal systems on economic outcomes; Section 2 outlines the empirical FGLS
panel model strategy, 3 reviews the and presents the descriptive statistics of the data used; results are
presented in Section 4. Finally 4.2 provides some brief summary remarks.
1 Background
The literature on economic growth and institutions and/or the rule of law is far deeper than the effects
of legal systems and income inequality and poverty. Rather, for many studies the examined causal
relationship is of the form ∆yt = f(gt|xt), where y is the log of real GDP, g is a measure of inequality,
and x represents a vector control variables. But the results remain inconclusive. In his review of the
literature to date Be´nabou (1996) concludes that inequality leads to lower growth. Deininger and Squire
(1998) find that there is a negative relationship between initial inequality and output growth. Moreover,
they demonstrate that inequality has an asymmetric effect on the bottom and top 20% income quintiles,
with growth benefiting the rich and hurting the poor.
Tests of the Kuznets’ hypothesis are similarly uncertain. Kuznets’ models essentially “flip” the
growth regression so we have gt = h(q(∆yt)|xt) where q(.) is a nonlinear, e.g. quadratic, function. In
addition to investigating the effects of inequality on growth Barro (2000) also estimates the Kuznets’
curve. He is able to find weak evidence for an inverted-U, but finds that the majority of inequality is
better explained by other variables: such rule of law, education, democracy, and trade openness. On the
other hand, Forbes (2000), using dynamic panel GMM analysis and more recent data, shows inequality
leads to better economic outcomes. Splitting the difference, Be´nabou (1996), concludes that the effects
of inequality on growth are ambiguous: “. . . our data has little to say . . . we are at the beginning of an
enormous enterprise.” They also warn that results can be sensitive to econometric techniques and data
manipulation.
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1.1 The Rule of Law and Economic Growth
I use the same breakdown of the same four theoretical avenues that the rule of law can follow to improve
economic performance, succinctly and nicely summarized, as in Haggard and Tiede (2011), here we will
only provide a brief overview, interested readers are recommended to refer to Haggard and Tiede (2011)
for further details and references. Later I will tie together each of these theoretical paths to the legal
variables chosen.
1. Security of the Populace: The rule of law should be primarily focused on the security of agents
as well as property. For contract theorists this the overarching goal of legal systems, because other
objectives, such as the ones discussed below, are irrelevant if an economy lacks security. What is
the point of the protection of property rights if the rights are not secured? As an example, consider
Enamoradoa, Lo´pez-Calva, and Rodr´ıguez-Castela´n (2014) who use municipality level data to show
that drug-related homicides, a proxy for violent crime, are a drag on economic growth. They also
show that non-drug related homicides have no effect on growth. Similarly, Ayers (1998) demonstrates
the negative relationship between violence in Latin America on overall economic development. More
recently, we can see the very real effects of violence in Central America, (e.g. Sacchetti, 2018). The
cycle of violence can be very difficult to shrug off and concurrently may require a complete overhaul
of the legal institutional structure: constructing a credible police force and legal and penal systems,
see Samuels (2006).
2. Check on Government: Of the four type of rule of law, this is more political and legal-centric.
In this framework, the legal system as a counterbalance to political power and discretion. From
an economic perspective, an impartial and/or independent judicial system is viewed as integral
to reducing the time-inconsistency problem which states that governments can and will renege on
contractional agreements (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
3. Protection of Property Rights: Property rights are well understood in growth economics. First,
as argued by North and Thomas (1973) and North (1989) well developed institutions contribute to
economic growth via incentives, property rights, and the reduction of transaction costs. North (1989)
further developed a theory of the impacts of institutional change on economic growth. Acemmoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) corroborate the findings of North (1981, 1989) and North and Thomas
(1973) in that the protection of property rights and the allocation of resources are necessary for
economic growth. Later Acemoglu et al. (2001), Acemmoglu et al. (2005), and Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) further enhance the empirical link between well defined property rights and economic
performance. On the importance of institutions on warrants considering them in the context of
income inequality, see Bennett and Vedder (2013).
4. Corruption: An implicit assumption well operating legal system is that challenges to integrity arise
from “external” malevolent players. However, if the challenges arise from the state itself in the form
of corruption, bribery, and or rent-seeking, the legal system itself might be captured by internal play-
ers. With respect to the rule of law, the first issue is that such a situation reduces individuals trust
in the legal system to objectively solve disputes. Secondly, rent-seeking potentially diverts resources
away from productive use reducing output and incomes of those without access to rent seeking, see
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Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991). And third, corruption and bribery lead to market distortions
that undermine long run economic performance and inequality, for example, monopoly and monop-
sony power, misallocation of government spending and transfers, e.g. “corporate socialism”, and
protectionism.
It is important noting that none of these variants are mutually exclusive. Later we apply an rule of law
interaction variable to estimate the optimal “mix” of legal innovations that yield the best results for
reducing inequality and poverty.
2 Empirical Model, Data, and Results
We begin our discussion by specifying a standard random effects panel model given by:
git = α+ βLSit + θLAi + z
′
itγ + λt + µi + it, (1)
where g represents the measure of income inequality or poverty; LS is the legal system variable, LA is a
Latin American dummy variable, z is a vector of controls, µi is a country specific random effect and  is
an i.i.d. error term. λt is a time fixed effect. The list of controls includes: two human capital variables,
the literacy rate and life expectancy at birth, real per capita GDP, in local currency units, and to measure
the structure of the economy I use government consumption, fixed private investment, and value added
of manufacturing, all as a percent of GDP, and the percentage of population that lives in rural area.
Given that changes in inequality and poverty are relatively invariant to time, this is a “decadal” fixed
effect. Details of the data are in Section 3 below.
Of most interest to us is the sign and significance of estimated coefficient for the legal variable, βˆ.
Ex ante we have no preconceived notions of what impact improvements to the legal system will have
on inequality and poverty. Clearly arguments could be made on both sides. If the judicial system
exists within more democratic society, courts may be more willing to answer to the citizenry and be less
beholden to political power, thus reducing inequality. On the other hand, a better and more independent
judicial system may feel less inclined to side in favor of redistribution, worsening inequality.
Indeed, is there any reason for the legal system to intervene on behalf of income inequality? Dimick
(2016) argues that rather than simply using tax policy for redistribution, a more efficient means is to
use a mix of legal rules and taxes. Similarly, Liscow (2014), using a Coasian framework, contends that
tweaking legal systems based on factors other than income can efficiently reduce inequality, given the
right conditions. Moreover, though some laws may reduce inequality, perhaps they are better viewed as
a positive externality.
In this general specification of the model, we assume standard strict exogeneity of the individual
effect, given by µ, and the error term,  – defining X = (LS, z)′, we have the following conditions:
E(it|X) = E(µi|X) = 0, E(2it|X) = σ2 and E(µ2it|X) = σ2µ. But more to importantly to our discussion,
the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are zero: E(µi |X ) = 0 , ∀i , j , and t ,E (itjs) = 0 if t 6=
s or i 6= j , and E (µiµj ) = 0 . However, if these strong exogeneity conditions are not present in the data,
the efficiency of the estimates is worsened, potentially leading to type II errors. The phrase “Africa
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is not a country” is applicable here. While there are similarities across the countries in Latin America,
obvious differences are apparent.2 Mexico has relatively close ties to the US and Canada because of trade
agreements, in particular, the updated version of NAFTA, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
Argentina’s economy has grown in fits and starts as successive governments have used expansionary policy
to curry favor with the voting populace, resulting in large macroeconomic fluctuations. The Venezuelan
economy’s dependence on oil as the fuel for growth and income distribution.
Nevertheless, despite the idiosyncrasies across Latin America there do exist, as discussed in Robinson
and Sokoloff (2004) and Gasparini and Lustig (2012), considerable historical similarities over the whole
region. Given the nature of the Latin American legal system which is based on historic ties to Spain
and many of the countries adopting the Chilean Civil law, which is based on the Napoleonic Code, and
the close economic ties between the Latin American economies, strong exogeneity is not a reasonable
assumption to make. Moreover, strong trade ties and the relative homogeneity of culture, history, etc.
leads to a breakdown of “standard” independence assumptions.
Thus, for our purposes we relax the strong exogeneity assumption and allow for the off-diagonal
elements to be non-zero, using a feasible GLS (FGLS) panel model. The FGLS estimator is given by
βˆ = (X′Σ−1X)−1X′Σ−1y
where Σ is the variance-covariance matrix. For the standard homoskedastic model we have
Σ = σ2 ⊗ I
where I is the identity matrix. If, on the other hand, we have heteroskedastic errors Σ becomes
Σ = σ2i ⊗ I, ∀ i.
However, a further complication occurs if data if there is cross-sectional correlation meaning the off-
diagonal elements are non-zero. Moreover, given the slow moving nature of the inequality and legal
system data, we must also consider the effects of serial correlation. Therefore, the study employs a FGLS
model with heteroskedasticity and correlation corrected error to conduct the analysis. Our empirical
strategy will allow for this last possibility, with errors generated within the group. Note, this does
not mean members of a group are contiguous countries, only that they share the same, OLS, error
characteristics. This is similar in spirit to error clustering or “clubs”.
Two versions of the model are considered, the first is equation (1). The second uses the model in
equation (1) but with two different panels of data, a Latin American (LA) sample and a non-Latin
American sample, θ = 0. Subsample analysis allows us to consider asymmetric impacts of legal systems
on inequality across the two regions. We will refer to Non-Latin America countries as the “rest of the
world”, RoW.
2The Latin American countries are: Argentina, Beliz, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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3 Data and Characteristics
The overall unbalanced panel sample period covers the years 1995 – 2014 for 147 countries, of which
seventeen are from Latin America. With the exception of the institutional variables, discussed below,
most of the data are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) collected
from various sources. The list of the variables and their sources are in Table 1. For dependent variables,
and as a robustness check, I use three different measures of income inequality: the Gini coefficient,
Gini ∈ (0, 1) with 1 being the most unequal. An issue with with using the Gini coefficient it is a relative
measure that is unable to capture absolute income, thus, it is conceivable that a drop in Gini coincides
with a rise in poverty. As such, and as a robustness check, I also use the Palma ratio, which is the
ratio of the richest 10% to the poorest 40% income share, this measure, or similar to it, for inequality
can be found in a number of studies, such as Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) and Daly and Wilson
(2013). The third inequality variable I use is the intra-time standard deviation of income shares across
income quintiles, SD(Share) =
∑5
i=1
√
ω2i where ω
2 is the variance of income shares at any point in
time. Poverty is measured using the poverty gap based on an income of three PPP 2011 $US per day.
For all these measures, larger magnitudes mean less equality and a larger poverty gap.
Four rule of law variables are included, all from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World
Index (EFWI) (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall, 2016). The Fraser Institute adapts the rule of law data from
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2017). For this study, we use Area
2, the overall legal system index, and three sub-indices: Court impartiality (Area 2B), the protection of
property rights (Area 2C), and extra payments/bribes/favoritism (Area 5Civ, denoted “Bribe”), which
acts as a proxy for corruption.
Table 1 Here
These data were chosen for the breadth of coverage and to keep the number of legal variables within
reason – the other legal system variable considered was court independence (Area 2A) as well as how
they coincide with the four rule of law definitions in Haggard and Tiede (2011), discussed in Section 1.1.
However, all the legal system indices are highly correlated, with average correlation between Areas 2,
2A, 2B, and 2C of about 0.83. All data are quantitative ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 denoting the most
“free”, or best rule of law.
The variable Legal Systems (Area 2), is the average score across the nine sub-indices, which in addition
to the variables discussed below includes: Military interference in rule of law and politics; integrity of
the legal system;legal enforcement of contracts; regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property; the
reliability of police; and the business costs of crime. All freedom law variables are in the range of 1 to
10, with 1 being the least free and 10 being the most free, put another way, as the indices get close
to 10, legal systems are more independent and less corruptible. This overall index is an instrument for
“Security”, discussed in Item 1 in Section 1.1
Court impartiality is measures a country’s ability to settle disputes between private businesses and
the government. This is used as “Check on Government”, discussed in Item 2 of Section 1.1 This
index captures how “captive” the court system is to government oversight. It is very similar to judicial
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independence which measures whether or not courts are free from political influences (the correlation
between the two is about 0.884). This variable also skirts issues of corruption in the courtroom, which is
different than the bribery variable discussed below, in that it measures whether or not the legal system is
free of government influence when deciding cases and whether not there is “crony” bias, or the perception
of it, (e.g. Hellman and Kaufman, 2004).
Property rights, Section 1.1 Item 3, is derived from the it Global Competitiveness Report and is
loosely defined as whether or not property rights, which includes financial assets, are poorly defined
and/or whether or not they are protected by law.
The category “bribes” is chosen as it is aligned with corruption and rent-seeking which are likely to
impact access to energy and serves as an instrument for democracy, summarized in Item 4 of Section 1.1.
This measure is not included in the size of government or legal system, but rather in Area 5, Regula-
tion. Area 5C is Business Regulations which asks respondents to estimate the number of undocumented
payments a firm must make to conduct business, e.g. import/export licenses, getting favorable decisions
in court, of interest to the current research, etc. Also, there is a literature on corruption and economic
performance which makes comparisons to the growth literature possible, for example, Barro (1996), Barro
(2000), and Podobnik, Shao, Njavro, Ivanov, and Stanley (2008), and inequality, Gupta et al. (2002).
Transparency International, among others, also constructs a corruption index, the Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI), see https://www.transparency.org/. However, this version was not used to keep
the calculation of the legal variables consistent.
The control variables used include those generally found in the inequality and growth literature. First,
to account for economic growth and/or technological change, we use per capita real GDP in local currency
units. As shown by Nuxoll (1994), using international prices, such as the $US, leads to systematically
different growth rates as compared to using GDP in domestic prices, called the Gerschenkron effect.
Thus, Nuxoll (1994) suggests that estimates using GDP in the domestic currency are more reliable.3
Two human capital controls are included: 15 and older literacy rate of and life expectancy at birth.
Private non-financial investment and government consumption, both as a percentage of GDP, are used
to account for changes in productivity, the accumulation of real assets and infrastructure investment.
Economic composition differences across the countries are proxied by the percent rural population and
the value added of manufacturing as percent of GDP. Regional cross sectional heterogeneity is accounted
for by time invariant regional fixed effects. Also included is the IMF’s global recession indicator used to
correct for global downturns. The IMF recession dates correspond to the 2007-08 financial crisis, so this
variable also captures this impacts. Variables which are not in percent or ratios are in natural logs.
Table 2 Here
Descriptive statistics of the unbalanced panel data can be found in Table 2 which includes the overall
panel number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for each of the data.
In the interest of saving space, only the inequality and poverty and law variables are presented. Panel A
shows the descriptive statistics for Latin America Only and Panel B contains the same variables for the
3Per capita real GDP in $US and PPP per capita real GDP in $US were also used with little change in the results.
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rest of the world, Not Latin America.
Immediately we can see that Latin America has more inequality and a larger poverty gap than the rest
of the world (RoW). It is also worth noting that while the standard deviation of each of the inequality
variables is low compared to the RoW, the poverty gap has a larger standard deviation. Moreover,
the difference between the minimum and maximum of each of the data is small across Latin America
as compared to the RoW, though this makes sense given the inclusion of, say, African and Western
European countries in the same panel. Turning our attention to the legal variables, a similar pattern
appears. Rule of law tends to be less robust in Latin America and generally less heterogeneous, with the
exception of the Palma Ratio. Also, as before, the difference between the minimum and maximum are
smaller in Latin America.
Table 3 Here
Correlations for the same eight variables are in Table 3, again separated into Latin American and
non-Latin American variables. All the correlations are significant at the 1% level. If we look at the
correlations between the legal variables and the measures of inequality and poverty, we see that the
correlations are, generally, negative, but smaller in Latin American than the RoW, implying a stronger
relationship between the rule of law and economic outcomes in the RoW. It is also worth noting that the
bribe variable is negatively correlated with the dependent variables in the RoW, but positive in Latin
America.
Figure 1 Here
Figures 1 and 2 show the median of each of the income inequality, poverty and law variables, with
the upper and lower bound for each period in Latin America. Generally speaking, income inequality has
improved over the sample period, Figure 1. This is contrary to earlier findings, such as Berry (1997),
which showed rising inequality between 1970-1995. Reasons given are a number of financial crises;4
structural and democratic reforms; a movement away from import substitution strategy, labor reforms,
currency-overvaluation, etc. in the earlier decades. Today, however, Latin American economies are now
benefiting from the reforms of earlier periods. Over the same period, two of the law variables have
remained more or less the same, Areas 2 and 2B. And while there has been an improvement in the
protection of property rights, including a sizable jump between 2003 and 2006, the opposite is true for
bribery which has steadily dropped since about 2003.
Figure 2 Here
Lastly, we consider the bivariate relationship between, in the interest of saving space, the Gini co-
efficient, the poverty gap, and the natural log of the four rule of law indices. Figure 3 shows bivariate
scatter plots, with a fitted line, for the Gini coefficient against the four rule of law variables for the Latin
American subsample, shaded areas are the 95% confidence interval. With the exception of Bribes, better
4For example, the Latin American Debt Crisis, the Peso Crisis, or the Argentinian peso crisis.
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rule of law coincides with more equality. Similar results are for the poverty gap, Figure 4, though the
relationship to Bribes has become marginally negative.
Figure 3 Here
Figure 4 Here
4 Results
4.1 Benchmark Models
We begin the discussion by considering a set of benchmark models first, presented in Table 4. The
benchmark model runs the panel FGLS regression in equation (1) without the legal variables. Because
much of the inequality literature concentrates on human capital as a determinant, only the estimates for
the literacy rate, life expectancy, real PC GDP, and the recession indicator are presented. Additional
benchmark regressions were also done isolating the education and health indicators, but are not presented,
results available on request as there is little difference between the results.
For each indicator, two different models are presented: the first uses the whole sample with a Latin
American fixed effect and the second divides the overall sample into Latin America only, denoted LA,
and the rest of the world, RoW . p−values are in parentheses, the regression Wald test, denoted χ2,
and the the number of correlation “groups”, denoted Covs., are also presented. We will concentrate the
summary on the two human capital variables: the literacy rate and life expectancy. For the model with
the Latin American fixed effect, we note that all estimates for Latin America are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. For the four models which use a fixed effect, literacy rate increase income
inequality whereas life expectancy reduces it. For the poverty gap, both human capital improvements
cause reductions in the gap.
Table 4 Here
A different pattern arises when the sample is divided, which allows us to consider possible asymmetric
effects of the variables on income inequality. Unlike in the previous model, for Latin America, the literacy
rate reduce inequality, whereas in the RoW it increases it, though the estimates are not statistically
significantly from zero. And while in the RoW, literacy rates have the expected sign for the impact
on poverty, they are not significant, unlike for Latin America, where literacy rates do reduce poverty.
As before, life expectancy also ameliorates inequality and poverty, it does not do so in a statistically
meaningful way for the Gini coefficient and the income share standard deviation in Latin America.
We also note that GDP growth increases inequality in Latin America, contrary to the results from
the OECD (2014). But, as discussed in Anand and Segal (2008), we have further evidence of the
ambivalence of the effects of growth on inequality because for the RoW, rising RGDP reduces inequality.
Unfortunately, results below will further add to the ambivalence on GDP’s impact on inequality as the
results show that either possibility is likely. Across the board, recessions reduce inequality and poverty
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in all models. Group sizes are consistent, with Latin America having 15 groups and the RoW 20.
4.2 Rule of Law
We now consider the effects of the four rule of law variables on each of the dependent variables in
turn, in Tables 5 – 8. Each of the tables is organized, as before, with the whole sample and a Latin
American dummy variable, and the two subsamples, LA and RoW . Panel I presents the results for the
overall Legal System index (Area 2); impartial courts (Area 2B) are in Panel II; Panel III has protection
of property rights (Area 2C); and results for bribes (Area 5Civ) are in Panel IV. Similarly, p−values
are in parenthesis, the number of groups, and the regression χ2. Again, only the results for the legal
system, the Latin American fixed effect, the two human capital variables, per capita RGDP, and the
recession indicator are presented. Results for the remaining control variables, %GDP investment, %GDP
government expenditure, %GDP manufacturing value added, % rural population, and time fixed effects,
are available on request.
The Gini Coefficient
Results for the Gini Coefficient can be found in Table 5. Regarding the entire sample with the Latin
American FE, a improved legal system reduces inequality for each of the indicators except an impartial
court, which has an elasticity of statistically significant estimate of 0.05. Latin American countries have
statistically significant positive impact on all four inequality measures. Generally literacy raises the Gini
coefficient while life expectancy reduces inequality. As before rising GDP raises inequality while recession
lead to a more equitable income distribution. In the overall sample, we can identify between 26 and 29
country groups.
If we now consider the LA and RoW subsamples, changes to the legal system have no statistically
significant impact on inequality, except for improvements to the protection of property rights, which has
a negative coefficient estimate. For the rest of the world, a better legal system leads to a higher Gini when
using Areas 2, 2B, and 2C, the impartial courts has no significant impact. And while bribe estimates
are negative in both subsamples, they are not significantly so in Latin America. It is worth highlighting
the protection of property rights across the two subsamples. The elasticity is –0.056 and 0.181 in Latin
America and the RoW respectively, both are significant at 1%.
Table 5 Here
Estimates for the reported controls are robust to the different legal variables. A rising literacy rate
lower the Gini in Latin America, the estimated coefficient is about –0.005 and positive for the non-Latin
American subsample. Results for life expectancy are less conclusive. For Latin America, the estimates
are always negative, but not significant, and for the RoW, two estimates are negative, using Areas 2 and
5Civ, one positive, with property rights as the rule of law measure, and the fourth no different than zero.
Lastly, estimates for output and the recession are robust to the different legal variables, elasticities for
the RGDP are positive for LA and significant, and the results for the RoW are less clear, estimates using
Areas 2C and 5Civ are significant but with opposite signs. Group sizes are roughly the same for each
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specification, Latin America is split into 14 groups, while the rest of the world is either 12 or 15 groups.
The Palma Ratio
Table 6 presents the results using the Palma Top 10%-Bottom 40% ratio. Results for the Palma ratio are
similar to those of the Gini coefficient, with different magnitudes, given the way the ratio is calculated.
Our discussion will use semi-elasticities rather than standard elasticities in the discussion above. Following
the same sequence as above, we will concentrate first on model which uses the full sample and a Latin
American FE. With respect to education and health, literacy has mixed results, though three of the four
have the predicted sign, they are insignificant, except when impartial courts are used as the law variable.
Life expectancy reduces the ratio with all but impartial courts, Area 2B, which has a positive estimated
coefficient. As before, RGDP and recessions respectively raise and reduce the Palma ratio. The number
of correlation groups is the same as above.
Similar results as above are found when we split the sample into two subsamples. We get ambiguous
results for Areas 2, 2B, and 5Civ for both subsamples. Again protection of property rights reduces
inequality in Latin America and raises it in the RoW, which provides additional support for importance
of their protection, as elucidated in North and Thomas (1973), North (1981), North (1989), Acemmoglu
et al. (2005), and Bennett and Vedder (2013). Bribes, a proxy for corruption, another well researched
research topic in the literature, has no significant impact on inequality. Perhaps, this because low income
people are generally unable to provide payments to receive favorable court decisions or gain access to
utilities for their businesses so it has little impact on income distribution.
Table 6 Here
For education and health, literacy always reduces inequality for Latin American countries but raises
the Palma ratio for the RoW. Life expectancy lowers the Palma ratio for both Latin American and none
countries, it is worth noting that declines in inequality are larger for the Latin sample with significant
estimates above | − 5.8| compared to none LA countries estimates in the (3.5, 4.6) range. As before,
higher RGDP leads to more inequality and recessions reduce it.
SD(Income Share)
Results for the standard deviation of the income shares are in Table 7. Concentrating first on the
Latin American FE model, estimates for the LA dummy variable are again positive, similar and highly
statistically significant. Only the overall legal system is significant at 5% or better, though the bribe
variable is also significant, but at 9%, both have the expected negative sign. When we use the standard
deviation of income shares, the literacy rate is not different zero in any of the estimates, but life expectancy
does reduce inequality in a meaningful way. Also, as before, higher RGDP leads to higher inequality
while the recession evens the playing field.
Table 7 Here
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More interesting is how the various variables influence inequality when we break the data into sub-
samples. Only the enforcement property rights has the anticipated sign which is statistically significant,
being –1.11. For the non-LA countries, the overall legal system and court impartiality lead to a higher
standard deviation. Bribe plays no role in explaining income standard deviations in either sample. We
also find the same number of country groups.
Estimates for literacy rates, life expectancy, RGDP and the recession also are robust across the
models, the exception is when using bribes as the measure of the rule of law. In Panel IV estimates for
RGDP are negative for both Latin America and the RoW, and significantly so, with semi-elasticities being
–0.19 and –0.88 respectively. In Latin America, both of the human capital measures reduce inequality,
though literacy is significant while life expectancy is not. For the RoW literacy increases inequality while
estimates for health are ambiguous, two reduce inequality and two increase it.
The Poverty Gap
While the previous three discussions centered around inequality, results in Table 8 concentrate on the
poverty gap. The Latin American dummy is again positive for the full sample, and significantly so in
Areas 2B, 2C, and 5Civ. The rule of law estimates are split positive, Areas 2B and 5Civ, and negative
for Areas A2, though not significant, and A2C. As before, we find that well defined property rights leads
to better income equality outcomes. Literacy rates and life expectancy again reduce inequality. Rising
RGDP reduces poverty when paired with the protection of property rights and raises poverty when bribes
are used as the legal variable, both are significant at 1% and on par with previous estimates, as is the
IMF recession indicator.
Table 8 Here
When the full sample is split into the subsamples, only the protection of property rights and bribe are
significant, and at the 1% level of confidence. In Latin America Area 2C reduces the gap, the estimated
coefficient is -3.5, while the opposite is true for the RoW, the semi-elasticity is 5.3. Bribes, on the other
hand, increase poverty, with a semi-elasticity of 4.4 in Latin America and have no effect on the RoW. As
with the full sample, both literacy and health reduce poverty in the Latin American sample, while for
the RoW literacy raises the gap and life expectancy reduce it. The other control’s estimates corroborate
previous results, despite measuring a different concept.
Optimal “Combinations”
Finally, to answer the question of which combinations of legal reforms would yield the best results
we conduct the analysis for the various legal combinations interacted. We have four legal variables
which yields ten possible combinations. In the interest of saving space, only those estimates which are
statistically significant at 10% or better are presented in Table 9. In all the regressions, combining
an improvement of property right protection with a reduction bribes, C.3, will yield the best results.
Combination C.6, the overall legal system and property rights is also significant, with the exception of
the standard deviation of income being the inequality measure.
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Table 9 Here
Summary
In this paper, I investigate the role the rule of law plays in explaining income inequality and the poverty
gap, with special attention paid to Latin America. While the rule of law is not necessarily responsible
for redistributing income, as would, say, tax policy, there are intuitively, and theoretically, attractive
explanations as to why it does have an impact on income distribution and poverty. For example, the
protection of property rights and corruption (i.e. bribery) have direct impacts on the distribution of
income and the ability to climb out of poverty. In addition, improvements to the rule of law coincide
with other measures of institutional improvements, such as democratization, government transparency,
regulation, etc.
However, the results here demonstrate that the effects of the rule of law is somewhat unique in Latin
America when compared to the rest of the world. In Latin America, improvements to the protection
of property rights will lead to a reduction in inequality and the poverty gap, whereas outside of Latin
America, the opposite is true. However, there is no statistically significant impact of improvements to the
other rule of law indicators on income inequality. Court impartiality tends to increase income inequality
in the rest of the world but has no significant impact on any of the dependent variables in Latin America.
On the other hand, corruption, perhaps unsurprisingly, does exacerbate the poverty gap, as in Gupta
et al. (2002).
When looking for an “optimal” mix of reforms to undertake, Latin America should concentrate the
protection of property rights and a reduction of corruption to reduce income inequality using all three
measures of distribution employed here. Alternatively, to improve income equality using the Palma ratio
and the Gini coefficient, better protection of property rights and the augmenting the overall rule of law
are effective. The poverty gap can be ameliorated through various combinations of legal enhancements,
but the best results occur if the protection of property rights is matched to the overall rule of law.
The results presented in this paper indicate that countries in Latin America could improve income
distribution by concentrating on enhancing the rule of law in Latin America. As seen in the descriptive
statistics, the overall state of Latin American legal system lag behind the rest of the world. Given that,
generally, Latin American inequality is also worse than in the rest of the world, the models presented
here indicate that gains to the legal system, in particular the protection of property rights, will lead to
a reduction of inequality and the poverty gap.
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Tables
Table 1: Data Description and Sources
Variable Name Source
Dependent Variables
ln Gini Coefficient World Bank, Development Research Group
Palma Ratio Same as above.
Std. Dev. of Income Share Same as above.
Poverty Gap $3/day (2011 PPP) Same as above.
Rule of Law
Area 2: Legal System & Property Rights Fraser Institute
Area 2B: Court Impartiality Fraser Institute, World Economic Forum, Global
Competitiveness Report
Area 2C: Protection of Property Rights Same as above.
Area 5Civ: Extra payments, bribes, favoritism Same as above.
Control Variables
Per capita real GDP (local currency units) World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files
Literacy rate (% 15 and older) UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
Life Expectancy World Health Organization Global Health Ex-
penditure
Investment non-financial assests (%GDP) International Monetary Fund, Government Fi-
nance Statistics Yearbook
Government consumption (%GDP) World Bank national accounts data and OECD
National Accounts
Value Added Manufacturing (%GDP) World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts
Percent rural population World Bank Staff based on United Nations,
World Urbanization Prospects
IMF Global Recession International Monetary Fund
Notes: All data are from the World Bank Development Indicators database except the Freedom
indices which are from the Fraser Institute.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N × T
A. Latin America Only
Inequality
ln(Gini) 3.93 0.10 3.69 4.14 290
Palma 3.68 1.11 1.88 8.60 289
SD(Share) 21.00 2.33 15.93 26.20 289
PovGap 8.64 6.08 0.33 33.80 291
Law
ln(LegSys) 1.50 0.26 0.63 2.08 310
ln(ImpCourt) 1.20 0.48 -0.69 1.96 293
ln(PropRts) 1.38 0.41 -0.14 2.02 268
ln(Bribe) 1.51 0.32 0.39 2.14 267
B. Not Latin America
Inequality
ln(Gini) 3.56 0.21 2.79 4.19 851
Palma 1.68 0.98 0.57 8.34 851
SD(Share) 14.28 3.51 6.21 28.87 851
PovGap 13.15 16.78 0.00 76.40 693
Law
ln(LegSys) 1.69 0.34 0.15 2.26 1992
ln(ImpCourt) 1.52 0.37 -0.09 2.27 1895
ln(PropRts) 1.67 0.37 -0.09 2.26 1587
ln(Bribe) 1.66 0.39 -0.48 2.30 1564
Notes: The inequality variables are: the Gini coefficient, the 90/40 Palma ratio
(Palma), the standard deviation of income quintile shares (SD(Share)), and
the Poverty Gap (PovGap). For the legal variables: LegSys is the legal system
(Area 2), ImpCourt is court impartiality (Area 2B), PropRts is protection of
property rights (Area 2C), and Bribe is extra payments, bribes, favoritism (Area
5Civ).
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Table 4: Benchmark FGLS Model
Gini Gini: LA Gini: RoW Palma Palma: LA Palma: RoW
Lit. Rate 0.001∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 -0.041∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.212) (0.746) (0.000) (0.525)
Life Expect -0.899∗∗∗ -0.286 -1.308∗∗∗ -3.436∗∗∗ -3.905∗ -4.086∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000)
Latin Am. 0.336∗∗∗ – – 2.117∗∗∗ – –
(0.000) (0.000)
PCRGDP 0.007∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.028) (0.000) (0.550)
IMF Rec. -0.018∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.121) (0.001) (0.000) (0.040) (0.001)
Obs. 145 84 61 145 84 61
SD Qts SD Qts: LA SD Qts: RoW Gap Gap: LA Gap: RoW
Latin Am. 6.337∗∗∗ – – 4.895∗∗∗ – –
(0.000) (0.000)
Lit. Rate 0.008∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.026
(0.008) (0.000) (0.373) (0.000) (0.000) (0.204)
Life Expect -15.112∗∗∗ -6.273 -22.585∗∗∗ -55.288∗∗∗ -35.675∗∗∗ -86.934∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PCRGDP 0.137∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ -0.063
(0.005) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.003) (0.623)
IMF Rec. -0.326∗∗ -0.422∗ -0.777∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗ -0.868∗∗∗ -0.383
(0.024) (0.063) (0.000) (0.046) (0.002) (0.545)
Obs. 145 84 61 145 84 61
Covs. 35.0 15.0 20.0 36.0 15.0 21.0
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Table 9: Legal Mix
“Combination” Gini Palma SD Qts Gap
C.1 – – – -0.393**
(0.019)
C.2 – – – -0.890***
(0.006)
C.3 -0.027*** -0.224** -0.431** -0.936***
(0.001) (0.024) (0.027) (0.006)
C.4 – – – -0.344*
(0.075)
C.5 – – – 1.743***
(0.000)
C.6 -0.023** -0.257** – -1.569***
(0.036) (0.026) (0.000)
C.7 – – – 1.249***
(0.000)
Notes: C.2 = Areas 2, 2B and 2C, C.2 = Areas 2B and 2C, C.3 =
Areas 2C and 5Civ, C.4 = Areas 2, 2C and 5Civ, C.5 = Areas 2 and
5Civ, C.6 = Areas 2 and 2C, and Mix C.7 = Areas 2B and 5Civ
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Figures
Figure 1: Latin American Inequality and Poverty: Median and Upper/Lower Bounds
(a) Gini (b) Palma Ratio
(c) SD(Share) (d) Poverty Gap
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Figure 2: Latin America Rule of Law: Median and Upper/Lower Bounds
(a) Legal System (b) Impartial Court
(c) Property Rights (d) Bribe
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Figure 3: Latin American Bivariate Relationship: Gini and Rule of Law
(a) Legal System (b) Impartial Court
(c) Property Rights (d) Bribe
Note: Shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 4: Latin American Bivariate Relationship: Poverty Gap and Rule of Law
(a) Legal System (b) Impartial Court
(c) Property Rights (d) Bribe
Note: Shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals
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